This paper focuses on the most recent trends of Chinese finance (FDI and development loans) in Latin America and their impact on economic development. In particular, this paper explores the economic and institutional factors that attracts loans and FDI from China to Latin America. Based on data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the United Nations on Chinese FDI and development loans to Latin America, this article argues that Chinese capital flows to the region, rather than politically motivated, are mainly motivated by trade interests, the evolution of the market of commodities, and natural resources-related policy goals. These capital flows are functional to the Chinese government's use of soft power in the region, but these goals are secondary to market-based interests.
Introduction
Current trends in the economic relationship between China and Latin America attract considerable attention from scholars and policymakers. Total trade between China and Latin America has increased substantially in the past decade, and China is now one of the top trading partners for some of the major economies in the region (i.e. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). FDI from China to Latin America has also expanded consistently since since 2000. The role of the Chinese government and its development agencies and banks is increasingly influential in the region, and more channels of cooperation seem to be available for China-Latin America economic relations.
There is empirical evidence that Latin American exports prices are increasingly driven by Chinese demand for natural resources and raw materials and there are symptoms of export dependency on China (Ortiz, 2012) . These patterns of trade specialization (Latin America is a net exporter of primary products and a net importer of manufactures) pose serious threats on manufactures exporters and small agricultural firms (Lall & Weiss, 2007; Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010; Gachúz, 2012; Gallagher, 2016) , and jeopardize technological innovation in the region (Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010; Gallagher, 2016) .
However, this booming relationship is not uniform across Latin America and only some few countries are truly engaged within the Chinese export-led development model. The role of Chinese trade and finance is not only heterogeneous but also relatively fragile across countries: while economic ties with commodity producers, natural-resources-oriented economies, and fiscal paradises are quite strong; the economic relationship between China and other economies is rather fragile. In fact, some scholars have presented evidence that refutes the notion that the long-term economic sustainability of Latin America is at risk because of the increasing trade dependency on China (Wise & Quiliconi, 2007; Gallagher & Irwin, 2015; Wise, 2016; Myers & Wise, 2016) . China's level of involvement in the region is still quite partial and sporadic. Trade with some countries has increased substantially, investments flows and stocks are larger and substantial, and some governments are quite active looking for stronger economic connection links. However, Latin American economies still have stronger links with the United States (e.g. Central America) and Western Europe (e.g. South America), and their trade links with China are not diversified enough to make them effectively dependent on the fluctuations of the Chinese economy.
This article argues that, despite the thriving trade between China and some Latin American economies, there is not a relationship of dependency, and both parts are rather enjoying or suffering the benefits and costs of global market cycles (Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010) .
The industrialization process in China is definitively shaping world commodity prices. Some Latin American economies have benefited from China's increasing demand for raw materials and they have also resented the implications of the slow economic growth in China and the subsequent fall of world commodity prices. However, most of the Latin American economies are not dependent on investment flows coming from China and the degree of participation of Chinese capitals in the region's industrial or agricultural sectors are still too weak 1 . Certainly, Chinese economic performance affects Latin American economic growth, but given the current patterns of regional integration to the global market, one cannot argue that Latin America is dependent on China or it will be in the near future.
The classic argument of the dependency theory is that global market conditions are structurally unfavorable for peripheral countries because they heavily rely on primary exports (i.e.
heavily specialized production of commodities) and high-value manufactured imports from the industrialized center (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Palma, 2016) . But dependency theory also claims that these new forms of economic dependency go beyond unfavorable terms-oftrade for peripheral countries and are better expressed in the dynamics of foreign direct investment and the ownership patterns of the dependent economies' means of production (Cardoso, 1972) . In this classical line of argumentation, the relation of dependency would be hardened by the increasing presence of foreign direct investment not only in primary and natural resources sectors, but also in strategic industrial and agricultural sectors.
Dependency theory also claims that these unequal relationships would lead to the stagnation of the industrialization process in the periphery (Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Palma, 2016) . In particular, it argues that the interplay between internal and external structures in contemporary capitalism creates serious obstacles to economic growth and industrialization, and also has negative effects on income distribution and job creation (Furtado, 1976) . In the economic relationship between China and Latin America, trade balance effectively favors the former. However, the economic relationship with China does not explain the structural problems and shortcomings of the Latin American industrialization process (Hausmann, 2011; Palma, 2011 The spectacular dimensions of these trade flows have obviously impacted the performance and structure of the Latin American economies (Ellis, 2009; Jenkins & Peters, 2009; Gallagher & Porzecanski, 2010; Wise, 2016 The benefits of trading with China are highly concentrated in a few countries. Figure   1 shows that although trade volumes increased for all the countries in the region, only few of them were capable of increasing their exports to China. In fact, China has become the largest trading partner for Brazil, Chile, and Peru, and the dynamism of such relationship is well described by positive or almost positive trade balance between those countries and China (panels b, c, and f in Figure 1 ). This is particularly remarkable in the cases of Latin American exports to China are still a very low proportion of the total regional exports -around 10% of the total in 2014 -(also see Gallagher & Porzecanski (2010) ;
OECD/ECLAC/CAF (2015)) and China's imports from Latin America do not reach 5% of its total imports. Over the past two decades the presence of Chinese imports in the region has substantially increased but it is not the region's main source of imports (especially in South America, where trade with the US and the European Union is quite intense). Table   1 shows that exports to China have increased substantially in Brazil (from 3% to 18% of total exports between 2001 and 2014), Chile (from 6% to 25% of total exports between 2001
and 2014), and Peru (from 6% to 18% of total exports between 2001 and 2014). In contrast, exports from Argentina only increased from 4% to 7% (of the total exports) and exports from Colombia only increased from 1% to 11% (of the total exports) in the same period of time. As noted above, trade between Mexico and China is completely unbalanced. Mexican exports to China (as % of the total exports) are modest and have not increased at all in the past 15 years. In the meantime, imports from China to the main Latin American economies (as % of total imports) increased from single digits to almost 20% in the same period of time. The empirical evidence presented in Figure 1 and In contrast with the modest contribution of Chinese FDI to the total FDI flowing to Latin America, Figure A2 (in the Appendix) shows that FDI from the United States accounts for a substantial portion of the capital investments coming to the region. For example, contrary to politician's rhetoric and pundits' opinion, FDI from US to Argentina (in average) accounts for more than 25% of total inward FDI in 2010 and for more than half of the FDI inflows in 2014. Not surprisingly, FDI from the US to Mexico is quite substantial and consistent.
American FDI accounts for almots half of the FDI inflows to Mexico over the past 15 years.
FDI from the US is less important for other major economies in the region (e.g. Brazil, Chile or Colombia), but it still accounts for about 20% of the FDI they receive annually.
The relative limited penetration of Chinese FDI in Latin America might be also fully apprehended from the perspective of the country of origin. Figure A1 (in the Appendix)
show FDI from China to Latin America as percentage of total outward Chinese FDI. FDI to major Latin American economies does not account for more than 2% of total outward Chinese FDI. The main recipients of Chinese FDI in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela) do not receive more than 3% of total outward Chinese investments. Chinese FDI in other major economies like Chile, Colombia or Brazil does not account for more than 0.5% of the total Chinese FDI in the past few years.
The evidence presented above shows that Chinese capital investments have a growing but still quite limited role in Latin America. Chinese FDI seems to be focused on extraction industries, natural resources, and infrastructure. Only in some few and isolated instances (e.g. Brazil), Chinese FDI has been directly targeted to the manufacturing sector (Chen & Perez, 2014; (Wei, 2000; Carr et al. , 2001; Di Giovanni, 2005; Büthe & Milner, 2008; Blonigen & Piger, 2014; Julio & Yook, 2016) . If this hypothesis is correct, it contradicts theories arguing that FDI is mainly driven by the size of the markets and political/geostrategic reasons (Tuman & Emmert, 1999; Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2006; Montero, 2008; Amal et al. , 2010; Corrales & Penfold-Becerra, 2011; Staats & Biglaiser, 2012) . Table 3 .
Model (1) in Table 3 Table 3 also suggest that the degree of trade openness has no significant effect on FDI from China. Thus, FDI is not attracted by potential trade opportunities; it is attracted by on-going trade links. Table 3 also show that the effect of political institutions on Chinese FDI flowing to Latin America is rather limited. Institutional risks for investment are definitively a relevant factor: Chinese FDI flows significantly increase as investment risks like contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payments delays are lower. However, the degree of government stability or the government ideology seem to be non-significant predictors of Chinese FDI flows to Latin America. In contrast with American investors, Chinese companies seem to be less concerned about institutional or political stability.
Models (1) to (3) in
In fact, the results presented in Table 3 not only provide evidence that Chinese presence in Latin America is mainly economically driven (or even trade driven), but also show that Chinese capital penetration has little to do with political or ideological reasons. Although substantial amounts of FDI outward flows are channeled through state-owned companies (e.g.
state-owned-oil companies), they do not seem to be allocated according to an ideological or "soft-power" logic. Chinese FDI flows towards Latin American seem to be driven by the existence of trade links and the availability of natural resources. This analysis confirms the export-oriented nature of Chinese FDI in Latin America.
Chinese lending
Recent scholarship on Sino-Latin American relations claims that China has emerged as the new biggest Latin American creditor and is providing alternative funding for governments in the region to increase their budgetary spending in times when access to global capital markets is limited for emerging and developing countries (Kaplan, 2013 (Kaplan, , 2015 . From this perspective, the commodities boom and the increasing Chinese state-led lending have endowed Latin
American governments with greater fiscal space and made them able to keep significant fiscal deficits. Kaplan (2015) actually argues that the availability of state-to-state financing with no market conditionalities increased Latin American governments' (especially left governments) policy freedom to use fiscal deficits and stimulate domestic economies.
However, the effects of Chinese finance on fiscal policymaking in the region are rather limited. On the one hand, the fiscal effects of Chinese lending are conditional to the investment channels, and there is evidence that they would only work if received through development funding -not through private banks (Kaplan, 2015) . This is the case of Venezuela where
Chinese lending increased substantially after 2008, and according to (Kaplan, 2015, 14) , it fuelled government's sizeable budget deficits since then. Brazil also received a substantial amount of loans from Chinese development banks, but most of them were channelized through the private sector and were not use to fund budget deficits. Additionally, Chinese development loans actually carry more stringent terms than Western banks loans (Gallagher et al. , 2012) , which makes them less functional as fiscal policy tools.
On the other hand, Chinese lending to Latin American governments is relatively small and too focused on countries that are not able to borrow as easily in global capital markets (Gallagher & Myers, 2015) . Argentina, and Ecuador received 91 percent of the total" (Gallagher et al. , 2012, 5) ), and most of the loans are loans-for-oil (Gallagher & Myers, 2015) .
Based on data provided by Gallagher & Myers (2015) , Figure A3 shows the value of in Orinoco). Like in Brazil, the Chinese government has implemented bilateral cooperation agreements with Venezuela that are mainly focused on improving and making oil production more efficient.
As noted above, Chinese lending in the past decade has mainly targeted oil and gas producers in Latin America. Minor oil producers (e.g. Colombia) or countries closely connected to the U.S. economy (e.g. Mexico) has received close to none lending from China. In other words, development loans are strategically allocated to facilitate China's energy policy.
In fact, most of these loans can be correctly classified as loans-for-oil bilateral agreements (Gallagher et al. , 2012 (Gallagher et al. , , 2013 .
The dimension of the Chinese lending to oil and gas producers in the region could erroneously make us conclude that China is the most important source of finance for the region.
As noted above, Chinese lending has a spectacular, but quite limited role in terms of pro- In other words, the role of Chinese lending in Latin America seems to be quite dependent on circumstantial factors. Chinese loans do not constitute a geopolitical tool used to shape Latin American economic development. In fact, the empirical evidence presented above shows that Chinese lending flowing to Latin American is significantly motivated by simply commercial reasons rather than being part of an effort to project soft power or to exercise some extractive diplomacy by locking up natural resources in the region (Gallagher & Irwin, 2015) .
New Dependency?: A preliminary conclusion Finally, state-to-state financing is rather limited and quite focused to a handful of countries, which makes Chinese diplomacy in the region less powerful. In fact, Chinese presence in the region seems to be market-oriented only; it seems to early to consider it a real geopolitical power in the region. Figure Figure A3 : Chinese loans to Latin America (US$ million). Source: Gallagher & Myers (2015) 
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